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Abstract
Erich Fromm was central to the Frank-
furt Institute of Social Research under the 
direction of Max Horkheimer, but the wor-
ks of each author, while handling at times 
similar issues, took different paths. The ar-
ticle’s aim is to analyze how Horkheimer’s 
anthropology, which would be of importan-
ce in Dialectic of Enlightenment, was built as 
the author embodied in his essays elements 
of Fromm’s social psychology, albeit overco-
ming some of its limitations, as well as sug-
gesting new potentials of critique.
Palabras Clave: critical theory; anthro-
pology; character; Max Horkheimer; Erich 
Fromm; domination.
Resumen
Erich Fromm fue fundamental para el 
Instituto de Investigación Social de Frank-
furt dirigido por Max Horkheimer, pero las 
obras de cada autor, mientras que a veces se 
enfrentaban a problemas similares, siguieron 
caminos diferentes. El objetivo del artículo 
es analizar cómo la antropología de Hor-
kheimer, importante en la Dialéctica de la 
Ilustración, se construyó cuando el autor in-
corporaba elementos de la psicología social 
de Fromm, aunque superaba sus limitacio-
nes y sugería nuevos potenciales de crítica.
Keywords: teoría crítica; antropología; ca-
rácter; Max Horkheimer; Erich Fromm; do-
minación.
This article is based on ideas developed in my doctoral thesis, Crítica da autoridade: 
dominação e emancipação na obra de Max Horkheimer (“Critique of authority: domination 
and emancipation in the work of Max Horkheimer”), supervised by Associate Professor Dr. 
Ricardo Musse and defended in September 2017 at São Paulo University. This study was 
financed by CAPES (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior) and 
CNPq (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico), both of them 
Brazilian federal agencies for the development of scientific research.
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The incorporation of ideology and psyche as research objects was a clear expression of the route change in the intellectual work done at the Frank-furter Institute of Social Research, after the 1920s had been marked, under 
Carl Grünberg’s directorship, by issues in Political Economy. Having been respon-
sible for sociopsychological matters in the Institute between 1930 and 1938, Erich 
Fromm carried out the reunion of Marxism and psychoanalysis within Max Hork-
heimer’s research program, and coordinated the empirical studies with workers and 
employees, which took place in the beginning of the thirties: the idea was that a 
corpus of “authoritarian” representations - such as the belief in the eternal necessity 
of hierarchical order and in the irrelevance of individual action in view of society 
powers - would play a fundamental role in conserving social order, as they were 
accepted by members of German proletariat, which was undergoing a process of 
social integration since the failure of revolution attempts in the dawn of Weimar 
Republic, and which would be soon a target of Fascist propaganda 1. If Fromm’s 
social psychology was decisive for the study with workers and employees, that does 
not mean that he and Horkheimer had been building identical social theories. It is 
important to understand the specificity of Horkheimer’s and Fromm’s theoretical 
undertakings during the 1930s, for early critical theory’s reception largely oblite-
rates differences between them 2. In the following I try at first to outline the main 
1  The central role played by Fromm in the Institute is transparent and well-known in the reception of early critical 
theory. See, among others, Wiggershaus, R., The Frankfurt School: its history, theories and political significance, 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995, passim. The study with workers and employees, whose results, in its complete 
and analyzed form, would only be published several decades later, is documented in the Studies on Authority and 
the Family from 1936, the first publication to be viewed as a result of the Institute’s collective research program, 
and Fromm was mentioned nominally in Horkheimer’s “programmatic” essays. See, for example, Horkheimer, 
M., “Geschichte und Psychologie”, Max Horkheimer - Gesammelte Schriften (Vol. 3), A. Schmidt and G. S. Noerr 
(Eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1988 (1932), pp. 60-61.
2  This interpretation, which goes back at least to Martin Jay and Helmut Dubiel (whose works date respectively 
from 1973 and 1978), was shared by Axel Honneth, when he accused critical theory from the 1930s of func-
tionalism and of a “sociological deficit”, as well as by John Abromeit, who (although in a different direction) 
argued for the existence of “theoretical elective affinities” between Fromm and Horkheimer, at least until 1937. 
See Dubiel, H., Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung – Studien zur frühen Kritischen Theorie, 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1978, p. 177; Jay, M., A Imaginação Dialética – História da Escola de Frankfurt 
e do Instituto de Pesquisas Sociais: 1923-1950, Rio de Janeiro, Contraponto, 2008, pp. 149-153; Honneth, 
A., “Teoria Crítica”, A. Giddens and J. Turner (Eds.), Teoria Social Hoje, São Paulo, Unesp, 1996. pp. 524-536; 
Abromeit, J., Max Horkheimer and The Foundations of the Frankfurt School, New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 2011, pp. 207-219. As Katia Genel pointed out, though, convergences between Fromm and Horkheimer 
were rather “ephemeral” and “ambivalent”. See Genel, K., Autorité et emancipation: Horkheimer et la théorie 
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elements of Fromm’s theory of “authoritarian character”, in order to argue in a 
second moment that they were dialectized in Horkheimer’s essays, having been 
used by the Institute director in the development of his “anthropology of bourgeois 
era” and of his conception of bourgeois individual as resting mainly on self-preser-
vation, a notion which would play a central role in Dialectic of Enlightenment. By 
so doing, Horkheimer undertook, as I hope it will become clear in the following, 
a sort of fetishism critique that analyzed the contradictions of bourgeois society as 
evolving by means of historical processes of domination. This operation also made 
it possible for Horkheimer to indicate emancipation possibilities, albeit scarce and 
needing of systematic elaboration. As long as in Horkheimer’s texts the basic con-
cepts provided by Fromm assumed new meanings and functions, the relation be-
tween both authors’ contributions can be understood not only from an institution-
al point of view, but also as one between “traditional” and “critical” theories, in the 
sense predicted by Horkheimer in the famous 1937 essay 3. 
1. Aspects of Erich Fromm’s “characterology”
Fromm provided the basic concepts to determine the prevailing character 
structure among individuals who answered the survey belonging to the study done 
with workers and employees: a) “authoritarian character”, in which submission to 
authority would be the main source of drive gratification; b) “revolutionary char-
acter”, in which this source would have disappeared and the individual would be 
tendentially anti-authoritarian; c) “ambivalent character”, a specific manifestation 
of authoritarian character, in which authoritarian personality trends would be less 
extreme, and almost always mixed with “progressive” tendencies. Having started 
to conduct the survey in 1929 (four years before Hitler’s rise to power), Fromm 
expected initially that individuals belonging to the proletariat would be less likely 
critique, Paris, Payot, 2013, pp. 134-148. This also seems to relate to the progressive character of Horkheimer’s 
adherence to Marxism - an issue unfortunately impossible to handle here. 
3  Horkheimer, M., “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie”, Max Horkheimer - Gesammelte Schriften (Vol. 3), A. 
Schmidt and G. S. Noerr (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1988 (1937), pp. 190-200. As we shall see, Hor-
kheimer’s anthropology is thus in my view (and together with its consequences in the joint work written by him 
and Adorno in the 1940s) the result of a specifically Marxist critique of traditional anthropological conceptions, 
instead of consisting on a break with the Marxist approach presented by Horkheimer in the famous 1937 essay. 
If it is correct, the interpretation presented here therefore suggests some continuity lines between Horkheimer’s 
Marxism in the 1930s and his and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, which has traditionally been interpreted 
as a break with early critical theory - a perspective to which Habermas has mostly contributed. See, for example, 
Habermas, J.,“Nachwort”, Dialektik der Aufklärung – Philosophische Fragmente, M. Horkheimer and T. W. 
Adorno, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1986, p. 282 ss. 
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to have an authoritarian character structure, since they presumably had not under-
gone the same process of internalization of social coercion which historically was a 
part of the rise of the bourgeoisie (having expressed itself in the ethics of work and 
duty most particular to this class) - a kind of socialization, though, which had lost 
its effectiveness along with the decline of paternal authority 4.
Although the main position occupied by “family” in Horkheimer’s research pro-
gram (and in Fromm’s social psychology) was due to psychoanalysis, this subject 
was important to Marxism at least since Bebel’s Woman and Socialism and Engels’s 
Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, and Fromm’s attention to these 
issues was (as well as Bebel’s and Engels’) strongly influenced by the debate on 
matriarchal societies, which went back to Bachofen’s theories. Mother right would 
have been essential to primitive communism, and patriarchal domination was seen 
as bound to the class character of domination under capitalism (of which followed, 
as a result, that fight against capitalism and fight for woman’s liberation should be 
connected) 5. The view of matriarchy as a sociability form in which class domina-
tion was absent influenced Fromm’s concept of “revolutionary character”, whose 
main traits were generosity and solidarity, in opposition to the aggressive and ego-
istic “authoritarian character”: both were named in Fromm’s 1934 text on matriar-
chy respectively “matricentric” and “patricentric” character 6. During history, given 
the existing alienation between social life and the individual, the main libidinal 
structure would have been the “authoritarian character”, a set of personality traits 
related to the sadist and masochist tendencies, which are manifest in the anal stage 
of sexual development 7. 
4  Fromm, E., “Die sozialpsychologische Bedeutung der Mutterrechtstheorie”, Erich Fromm Gesamtausgabe (Vol. 
1), R. Funk (Ed.), Stuttgart, DVA, 1999 (1934), p. 107 infra. This forecast would meet difficulties within 
Fromm’s own theoretical framework, as we shall examine later. Fromm gave particular attention to the “au-
thoritarian“ character type, leaving the two others scarcely described. “Revolutionary character” was defined as 
the one in which sadistic and masochistic drives would be less significant or have disappeared: this would be a 
“revolution in a psychological sense”, which would render those individuals particular apt to take part in anti-ca-
pitalist movements and in the foundation of a society in new bases, in which authority relations would become 
rational and lack of “regressive” psychological elements. See Fromm, E., “Sozialpsychologischer Teil”, Studien 
über Autorität und Familie – Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung, M. Horkheimer et al., 
Lüneburg, Dietrich zu Kampen Verlag, 1987 (1936), pp. 130-132. Horkheimer’s indication that the empirical 
studies aimed at the construction of “character types” leaves no doubt about the centrality of Fromm to the Insti-
tute’s collective research program. Horkheimer, M., “Vorwort”, Studien über Autorität und Familie, op. cit., p. X. 
5  The domination over women would guarantee patrilineal transmission of private property, in opposition to the 
collectivism existing in matriarchal societies, a kind of social organization that did not rest on class domination 
and could therefore present “fraternal” and “democratic” trends. Fromm, E., “Die sozialpsychologische Bedeu-
tung der Mutterrechtstheorie”, op. cit., p. 92-101. 
6  See Fromm, E., “Die sozialpsychologische Bedeutung der Mutterrechtstheorie”, op. cit., p. 104 and p. 107.
7  See Freud, S., “Charakter und Analerotik”, Sigmund Freud - Gesammelte Werke (Vol. VII), A. Freud et al. (Eds.), 
Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1987; and also Fromm, E., “Sozialpsychologischer Teil”, op. cit., p. 115 and p. 121. 
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As for Freud both tendencies would always occur together, societies that pro-
duce as their typical libidinal structure the “authoritarian” one should supply grat-
ification for both: thereby, members of the ruling class would oppress sadistically 
individuals belonging to the dominated classes, but their masochistic tendencies 
would be satisfied, by their turn, through submission to those at the top, should 
they be elected rulers, kings or fascists leaders, or even the mere ideas of God or 
destiny. In a similar way, members of oppressed classes, if on the one hand they 
could express their masochism by loving and admiring their aggressors, on the 
other, their sadistic tendencies could be satisfied through the oppression of women, 
ethnic minorities, children and animals: “every hostility and aggression that cannot 
arise against the stronger finds its object in the weaker ones (...) and what would 
mean a more complete domain than compelling them to pain!” 8. Following this 
scheme, Fromm’s basic idea was that individuals’ libidinal structure would adapt to 
the social relations of production: it would be the mortar [Kitt] 9 that could endow 
such relations with stability, for it would be capable of anchoring them in the in-
dividuals’ psychic apparatus. Family, by its turn, would be, in Fromm’s terms, the 
“psychological agency of society”, for it would, as the first locus of socialization, 
fulfill the role of producing the libidinal structure at each time most adequate to 
social needs 10.
Examining with some more attention Fromm’s “analytic social psychology” can 
bring to light some of its problems. Fromm stressed that the amount of sadistic and 
masochistic traits in the individuals’ libidinal structure had varied along socio-eco-
8  Fromm, E., “Sozialpsychologischer Teil”, op. cit., p. 117. By that reasoning family was considered to be a structu-
re that held a continuity relation with a social order which it would merely reproduce, and family’s specificity was 
not taken into account. The mechanicism of this postulate is easily refuted by observing a few concrete examples. 
Besides, if so, in order to know what happens in social structure it would suffice to analyse family structures and 
compare them with each other. This critique was developed by Görlich, B., Individuum und Gesellschaft – zum 
Versuch der Synthese von Freud und Marx im Frommschen Gesamtwerk (doctoral thesis), Frankfurt am Main, 
University of Frankfurt, 1979, p. 98. Fromm’s formulations on this subject become even more unintelligible if 
we consider the results achieved in the survey with workers and employees, which revealed – in accordance with 
Reich’s thesis of fascism as a lower middle class movement – that employees, a higher status group than that of 
workers, had at the same time stronger authoritarian inclinations than them. See Reich, W., Psicologia de Massas 
do Fascismo, São Paulo, Martins Fontes, 1988 (1933), p. 52.
9  Fromm, E., “Über Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie”, Erich Fromm Gesamtausgabe 
(Vol. 1), R. Funk (Ed.), Stuttgart, DVA, 1999 (1932), p. 57.
10  In general, therefore, individuals belonging to dominated classes would have to repress their drives more in-
tensely than those belonging to dominant class. This theoretical conception excluded then the own research 
hypothesis, which predicted that members of proletariat would tend to develop anti-authoritarian character 
traits. The seeming simplism of Fromm’s reunion of Marxism and psychoanalysis is apparently fit to support 
the accusation of functionalism brought by Axel Honneth against the explanations on authoritarian character 
developed by Fromm and Horkheimer in the 1930s. But Honneth has in my view not differed sufficiently be-
tween both authors. See Honneth, A., Kritik der Macht – Reflexionsstufen einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie, 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1985, pp. 33-41.
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nomic conditions though history: this way, the typical bourgeois entrepreneur in 
the free concurrence period of capitalism had reached a sense of autonomy that 
corresponded to the development of genital sexuality. This process had presumably 
expressed itself in the domination of nature and society according to the bour-
geoisie’s class interests, as well as in meritocratic and “more democratic” ideolo-
gies and forms of domination 11. In this parallelism between class domination, the 
psychosexual development of its members and the correspondent rising of specific 
ideologies there are several presuppositions, which can be the object of critique. 
The first of them is a rationalistic distinction between “autonomy” and “heteron-
omy”, which considers the “autonomous” or “strong” ego to be the one capable of 
dispensing with emotional elements in submission to authority, and therefore with 
sadistic and masochistic drives, these being seen as “heteronomy” sources 12. The 
second presupposition is the overlap between socio-economic domination exer-
cised by some class and the level of autonomy reached by its members, which is to 
say the implication between control over external and internal nature, the last one 
being understood as ego strengthening and the reduction of sadistic and masochis-
tic elements 13. The third presupposition is that ideologies, be they “authoritarian” 
or, otherwise, “liberal” and “democratic”, would be mere rationalizations of drives 
originated from the id, which would rely, for their effectiveness, on the character 
structure of individuals 14. 
The psychic apparatus of these would be formed according to the demands of 
productive structure – Fromm conceived this one, yet, as a sphere that would be 
11  See Fromm, E., “Sozialpsychologischer Teil”, op. cit., pp. 132-133.
12  In his “culturalist” period, after having emigrated to the United States, and when Marxian and Freudian ele-
ments in Fromm’s work were to be progressively dissolved in a “humanist psychoanalysis”, this perspective 
would nonetheless remain valid through his concept of “productivity”. See Fromm, E., Man for Himself – an 
Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics, New York, Henry Holt, 1990 (1947).
13  This would have been the case of individuals belonging to the bourgeois class that ascended in the eighteenth 
century: they would have been individuals with a “strong ego”, capable of dominating internal and external 
nature, and thereby “autonomous”. On the other side, in twentieth century monopoly capitalism, individuals 
belonging to petty bourgeoisie would have a weakened ego, that is to say an ego with a libidinal structure in 
which prevailed pregenital elements of sexuality. According to Fromm, sadistic and masochistic drives would 
be bound to class domination, and would tendentially disappear in emancipated society, being reduced to a 
pathological individual manifestation, as men would have freed themselves from alienation and established 
rational authority relations, in the pursuit of common interests. Fromm, E., “Sozialpsychologischer Teil”, op. 
cit., p. 122. For a critique of this view, see Görlich, B., Individuum und Gesellschaft, op. cit., p. 97. 
14  Ideologies would be, according to Fromm in his programmatic text from 1932, “the expression of determinate 
desires and needs anchored in the drives”, or “rationalized manifestations of the drives”. Fromm, E., “Über 
Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie”, op. cit., p. 37. According to Helmut Dahmer, 
the conception of ideologies as private rationalizations (instead of as necessarily false consciousness) brought 
Fromm nearer to Pareto than to Marx. See Dahmer, H., Libido und Gesellschaft – Studien über Freud und die 
Freudsche Linke, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1973, p. 311. 
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“extra-human” and subsist independently of man, and not as a socially mediated 
one: the author remained tied to matter/mind dualism, succumbing himself to 
the inversion between subject and object, a trait of the fetishism inherent to so-
cial relations under capitalism 15. The same as what refers to his concept of “char-
acter”, understood as a productive force that would link certain socio-economic 
structures and corresponding ideologies: the aim of socialization would then be 
to form individual libidinal structure according to social demands, therefore be-
ing rewarded those individuals to whom socially desirable behavior appears as 
something natural (an idea that served, although under other theoretical perspec-
tive, as the core assumption of functionalistic sociology). Fromm yielded in that 
way to a reifying perspective, inasmuch as he did not historicize the own fact that 
one can discern something like “character structures”, which are only possible as 
a result of the inversion between subject and object. In so doing, Fromm postu-
lated a sort of functionality between socio-economic conditions, character and 
ideologies, taking social phenomena in their positivity and reducing the critical 
potential of his theory 16. 
Fromm’s conception of Marxism, which reduced it to a theory of determination 
and retroaction between base (social relations of production and productive forces, 
among which were character structures) and superstructure (ideologies), tied it to 
15  Fromm, E., “Über Methode und Aufgabe einer Analytischen Sozialpsychologie”, op. cit., p. 46. It is true that the 
author referred sometimes to “reification”. But he understood it, under the influence of Max Weber, as “rationali-
zation”, reducing this phenomenon to its psychological expressions: systematicness, indifference, formalistic sen-
se of duty and stubbornness, all of which combine well with the tendency to commodification of potentially all 
social relations. See Fromm, E., “Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie und ihre Bedeutung für die Sozialpsy-
chologie”, Erich Fromm Gesamtausgabe (Vol. 1), R. Funk (Ed.), Stuttgart, DVA, 1999 (1932), pp. 70-74.
16  As argued by Wolfgang Bonß, Fromm’s social psychology, as far as it naturalized the dichotomy between sub-
ject and object and inspired itself in methodological thinking proper to natural science, was very little able 
to overcome the limits of other experiments in uniting Marxism and psychoanalysis, such as those made by 
Freudo-marxists like Reich, Bernfeld and Fenichel. See Bonß, W., “Psychoanalyse als Wissenschaft und Kritik. 
Zur Freudrezeption der Frankfurter Schule”, Sozialforschung als Kritik, W. Bonß and A. Honneth (Eds.), pp. 
381-382. In his brief commentary on Fromm’s contributions to the Institute, in the introduction written for 
the republication of the Institute’s journal, Alfred Schmidt drew attention on the fact that Fromm conceived of 
Marxism as of a traditional social theory. See Schmidt, A., “Die ‘Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung’ – Geschichte 
und Gegenwärtige Bedeutung”, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (Vol. 1), M. Horkheimer (Ed.), Munich, DTV, 
1980, p. 33. Adorno, evoking the criticism which had been made by revisionists (neo-Freudian psychoanalysts) 
against Freud, argued that “(...) neo-Freudian school has done to character traits that which Freud [according 
to themselves] would have done with drives”, in other words, neo-Freudians (such as Fromm) accused Freud 
of biologicism and of having been tied to a naturalism from which followed the need to complement his 
psychoanalysis with a social theory, but at the same time hypostatized themselves the manifestations of drive 
dynamics – Adorno ironized them by saying they “projected” in Freud their own rationalistic scientific proce-
dure. See Adorno, T., “Die revidierte Psychonalyse”, Sociologica II - Reden und Vorträge, M. Horkheimer and T. 
Adorno, 1962, pp. 120-125. On the differences between Adorno’s theory and that of “ego psychology” proper 
to revisionists, see also the considerations done by Crochik, J. L., Preconceito, Indivíduo e Cultura, São Paulo, 
Casa do Psicólogo, 2006, p. 102.
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a determinism whose narrow explanatory power revealed itself clearly when the 
author focused on the role that the psyche could play in overcoming capitalism. 
While suggesting that economic crisis and the deepening of class struggles could 
favour a sort of libidinal structure that would act in the direction of destabilizing 
capitalist social relations 17, Fromm also argued that the deepening of social con-
tradictions could have the opposite effect, and reinforce authoritarian character 
structure 18. As far as he conceived of “character” as of something natural, Fromm 
was not able to undertake a sort of ideology critique that took into account eman-
cipatory elements pertaining to capitalist mode of production itself, and his social 
theory drew on the undialectical projection of a kind of domination to be based on 
“solidarity and mutual interests”, which would command labor organization and 
the domination of nature 19. 
2.  Historicizing Fromm’s concept of “character”: Horkheimer’s anthropology of 
the bourgeois era
If in Fromm’s works the concept of “character” was regarded as something natu-
ral, in Horkheimer’s essays it was understood as a result of reification, and therefore 
as a form of subjectivity, inseparable from capitalism. Fromm had defined “authori-
tarian character” by sadomasochism: it would be, as we have seen above, an element 
of alienated society in general, albeit intensified under monopoly capitalism. How-
ever, for Horkheimer domination relied not so much on the sociopsychological 
traits of social relations: although these might very well play their role, as in the 
case of emotional identification with the political leader, domination rested mainly 
in the reified form of experience in capitalistic society, expressed in subordination 
“to the necessity of facts” 20. Accordingly, if Fromm stressed the intensification of 
sadomasochism under monopoly capitalism, Horkheimer, in turn, asserted that the 
17  Fromm, E., “Über Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie”, op. cit., pp. 56-57. 
18  Fromm, E., “Sozialpsychologischer Teil”, op. cit., pp. 121-122.
19  This would be the case in classless society, which would allow an “authentic community between higher and 
lower ranks”, which Fromm viewed in primitive communism as well as in Russia contemporary to him, where 
the building of this kind of domination would be in course. See Fromm, E., “Sozialpsychologischer Teil”, op. 
cit., p. 112. His concept of “revolutionary character”, which Fromm used in the research with workers and 
employees, had similar shortcomings (Ibid., p. 131.). On the lack of a proper place for this concept within 
Fromm’s own theoretical framework, see Bonẞ, W., “Psychoanalyse als Wissenschaft und Kritik. Zur Freu-
drezeption der Frankfurter Schule”, op. cit., p. 384. 
20  Horkheimer, M., “Aus Vorlesungen über Autorität und Gesellschaft”, Max Horkheimer - Gesammelte Schriften 
(Vol. 12), A. Schmidt and G. S. Noerr (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1985 (1936/1937), pp. 60-64.
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fundamental feature belonging to character structure of individuals living in that 
historical period (which is still ours) would be “abstractiveness”: 
“As long as character bound to authority, i.e. the sadomasochistic one, is not at all a new 
phenomenon – it can be seen in the whole history of bourgeois society – its peculiar abs-
tractiveness and hardening seem symptomatic of a world that holds on to family authority, 
even after family’s internal substance has dissolved. To the abstract glorification of family 
corresponds an almost total absence of concrete relations with parents, be they positive or 
negative. In consequence, the whole emotional life of character bound to authority contains 
traits of superficiality and coldness that sometimes are close to the ones that can be observed 
in psychopaths” 21. 
Fromm’s conception of family as “society’s psychological agency” would not suf-
fice then to explain the main traits of the specific form assumed by authoritarian 
character in the first half of twentieth century, and this even because family au-
thority was then in decrease 22. Contemporary prevailing character structure led 
Horkheimer to interpret the historical formation of bourgeois individual in the 
light of his “abstractiveness” 23. It’s shaping would go back to the era of the rise 
of bourgeoisie, and “education for the justice inherent to reality”, which marked 
protestant families in their beginnings, would be the origin of indifference in view 
of individual suffering (as far as the own interests, or those of the own family and 
21  Horkheimer, M., “Autorität und Familie in der Gegenwart”, Max Horkheimer - Gesammelte Schriften (Vol. 
5), A. Schmidt and G. S. Noerr (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1987 (1947/1949), p. 389. In this text, 
reference to the psychopatic traits in contemporary individual recalls the analyses on antisemitism and paranoia 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
22  Let us note that Horkheimer, who refused any functionalism and recognized the own legality of social spheres, 
had a different understanding of the role played by family, and did not equate it with a structure that would 
solely reproduce sadomasochism. Horkheimer stressed contemporary family’s crisis: the loss of its role as an eco-
nomic production unity, the concurrence with other institutions that had begun to influence the education of 
the youth (like radio and public school), the attendance by the state of functions that until them were exclusive 
to the family (such as social security and health), as well as, specially after World War I, economic crisis and 
unemployment led to the decline of paternal authority and to corresponding changes in socialization and the 
behavior of individuals, like the increase of womens’ functions within the family. These findings relied on the 
researches on family and authority, specially on the second and third ones. See Horkheimer, M. et al.., Studien 
über Autorität und Familie – Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung, Lüneburg, Dietrich zu 
Kampen Verlag, 1987 (1936), p. 273, pp. 303-305 and pp. 315-320. The assessment of family’s conversion in 
an institution that was progressively less able to offer resistance to determinations provenient from other cultu-
ral spheres made Horkheimer less prone than Fromm to associate some emancipatory potential to mother’s role, 
even because obedience to fascist state overlapped children’s obedience to their parents. See Horkheimer, M., 
“Allgemeiner Teil”, Studien über Autorität und Familie, op. cit., pp. 68-74. It may be worthy drawing attention 
to the fact that nowadays children’s subodination to their parents seems to be in an inferior hierarchical level 
than that of parents’ to culture industry and other ideologies of contemporary society: it suffices to think of 
childhood’s increasing commodification and on the fact that children become consumers each time sooner.
23  See Horkheimer, M., “Allgemeiner Teil”, op. cit., p. 30.
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of members of the inner circle were not in question). Indifference and coldness 
would characterize the behavior of individuals in a world increasingly mediated 
by commodity form, and therefore “alienness” [Fremdheit] would be, according to 
Horkheimer, the “anthropological category” of bourgeois era 24. 
To discover a timeless constant from which could be derived all possible forms 
assumed by “human nature” would be for Horkheimer an impossible task, since 
individual is inextricably bound to history, of which nothing could be said to be 
timeless 25. Whilst he refused any idealistic anthropology that would postulate some 
unchangeable human nature, Horkheimer at the same time considered to be legit-
imate the question whether capitalism produces determinate personality constants 
instead of other ones, for it would be especially important for a theory compro-
mised with historical change to distinguish, in what relates to typical behavior and 
psychological constitution, among those persons and groups “better prepared to 
change and set up circumstances”, on the one hand, and those who would tenden-
tially reduce themselves to functions of given reality, on the other 26. Horkheimer’s 
anthropological reflections took then as their object the contradiction between the 
main element of bourgeois moral philosophy – the condemnation of egoism – and 
the pursue of self-interest, that is to say the practical behavior demanded by capi-
talist economy 27. 
This contradiction and its developments should, nonetheless, be examined histor-
ically, and taking into account their link to domination processes. The author argued 
24  “Every communication is business, a transaction between solipsistically built areas. Conscious being of such 
people can be reduced to a small amount of relations between fixed orders of magnitude. The language of lo-
gistics is its proper expression”. Horkheimer, M., “Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung – zur Anthropologie des 
bürgerlichen Zeitalters”, Max Horkheimer - Gesammelte Schriften (Vol. 4), A. Schmidt and G. S. Noerr (Eds.), 
Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1988 (1936), p. 71.
25  From that followed Horkheimer’s criticism of Max Scheler and others dedicated to philosophical anthropolo-
gy. See Horkheimer, M., “Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie”, Max Horkheimer - Gesammelte 
Schriften (Vol. 3), A. Schmidt and G. S. Noerr (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1988 (1935), pp. 250-251 
and p. 275. Anthropological theses would rather be themselves historical. Ibid., pp. 267-269.
26  See Horkheimer, M., “Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie”, op. cit., pp. 251-253. This would 
allow incorporating to Marxist theory some of the issues discussed by philosophical anthropology in an idealis-
tic fashion. See Horkheimer, M., “Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie”, op. cit., p. 260. 
27  In this sense, Horkheimer followed here the core aspect of the method of critical theory, as described by himself: 
to think “until the end” and expose the contradictions inherent to the general ideas and dominant principles in 
capitalist society. See Horkheimer, M., “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie”, op. cit., pp. 181-189. This raises 
a doubt as to whether Horkheimer’s anthropology can be thought of as something apart from Marxist critique. 
For this view, see Abromeit, J., Max Horkheimer and The Foundations of the Frankfurt School, op. cit., p. 17, who 
interpreted Horkheimer’s “anthropology of the bourgeois epoch” in the spirit of the “interdisciplinary materia-
lism”, as which Horkheimer’s work in the 1930s came to be known in the reception, and also Nobre, M. and 
Marin, I. L., “Uma nova antropologia. Unidade crítica e arranjo intedisciplinar na Dialética do Esclarecimento”, 
Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã (n. 20), São Paulo, Jul.-Dez. 2012, pp. 102-107, who interpreted it as a new critical 
model, which moved away from Marxian toward Freudian categories.
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then that, along with the social rise of bourgeoisie, a new direction was given to the 
psyche of members of capitalist society: the contradiction between egoism condem-
nation and the pursue of self-interest was to be seen as a result of the reification of 
drive dynamics, analyzed by Horkheimer on the basis of freedom movements in the 
end of middle ages and the beginnings of modernity, which brought to light the 
specific sociopsychological mechanisms which, at the most in a latent way, belong to 
daily life in bourgeois society and only manifest themselves in moments of disruption 
and disorder 28. Movements led by Cola di Rienzo, Savonarola, Calvin and Robe-
spierre (meant is here the Terror period) were part of bourgeoisie’s struggle against 
aristocracy, but had to rely heavily on the hatred devoted by the masses to ruling class, 
associated with egoism and pleasant life. The current image of an aristocracy indulged 
in luxury and pleasure stimulated popular sadism, and the mob punished in the ene-
mies of revolution the egoistic drives they had to repress in themselves 29. Conducted 
against absolutism, bourgeois freedom movements were at the same time able to 
reinforce the masses’ ability to obey prevailing authorities 30. Exteriorizing resentment 
though terror fulfilled then (and has always done so) an important sociopsychological 
function, inasmuch as it allowed individuals to go back to hard work and depriva-
tions, after they had taken part in decapitations and lynchings: cruelty against the 
enemies of revolutionary processes was closely linked with violence mobilized against 
the self and expressed in asceticism 31. 
Those historical processes had their correlate in philosophy, and difference be-
tween schools that conceived of man as virtuous (Locke, Rousseau) and those that 
stressed his bestiality (Luther and Hobbes) would be much more a political and 
circumstantial one, instead of properly “anthropological”: humanism would be the 
other side of misanthropy, the first one aiming at bourgeoisie, the second one at the 
masses 32. Both currents concealed themselves, therefore, in their common ideal: the 
28  Horkheimer, M., “Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung – zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters”, op. 
cit., p. 23, p. 70.
29  Those movements were in this way the forerunners of modern antisemitism, which associates jews’ alleged ex-
ploiter role with a life dedicate to intellectual idleness. See Horkheimer, M., “Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung 
– zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters”, op. cit., p. 77.
30  Horkheimer, M., “Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung – zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters”, op. 
cit., p. 33.
31  Horkheimer, M., “Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung – zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters”, op. 
cit., pp. 86-88. In this sense, liberation from feudal chains produced, as put by Jairo Iván Escobar Moncada, 
a sort of “(...) internal deformation that presents itself as true freedom”. See the author’s “Sobre la mentalidad 
burguesa en Max Horkheimer y José Luis Romero”, Rubén Jaramillo Vélez: Argumentos para la Ilustración 
contemporánea, J. C. Celis Ospina & R. A. Rubiano Muñoz (Eds.), Bogotá, Siglo del Hombre, 2014, p. 193.
32  Horkheimer, M., “Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung – zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters”, op. 
cit., pp. 9-16 and pp. 73-74. It is worthy noting that for Horkheimer it was not the case – as for Fromm - of 
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notion of human nature as targeted at self-conservation, and based on the aversion 
to pleasure. Dominant moral philosophy concealed then in its abstract universal-
ism and in the ethics of duty the contradiction between egoism condemnation and 
a social practice based on individual interest. This contradiction being insolvable 
within the boundaries of class society, it had to be turned, within the boundaries 
of the self, into indifference and alienness in view of others, and individual would 
reduce himself to “self-preservation” and “bourgeois coldness” 33. These would then 
be seen as conditions for progress within society, and every demand for uncondi-
tioned happiness would disappear, as well as yearning for pleasure would have to 
be disregarded in favor of more elevated values, such as morality, “common good”, 
and culture 34. 
By undertaking such analyses, Horkheimer historicized elements of Fromm’s 
theory (“character” and drives) and lift them to a different level of critique, as 
far as Horkheimer’s object here was the own constitution of character itself (that 
is, of a reified form). Therefore, it did not make sense for him to oppose in an 
undialectical fashion “revolutionary/matricentric character” (generous and sympa-
thetic), by one hand, and “authoritarian/patricentric character” (selfish, aggressive, 
and based strongly on sadistic and masochistic drives), on the other, for this op-
position was itself ideological. While overcoming by means of a determinate nega-
tion the dichotomies upon which rested Fromm’s concepts, Horkheimer elaborated 
an “anthropology of the bourgeois era”, which identified as the “human essence” 
under capitalism individual’s self-preservation and alienness in respect to others. 
Horkheimer then shed light on the process of drive hardening, by means of which 
“character”, in other words the constancy of certain psychological traits necessary 
to modern social life, was to be possible. This process of reification was besides 
historically constituted by means of concrete class domination – in Horkheimer’s 
words, “with hunger and house of correction in its background” 35. 
different degrees of drive repression according to class, even though egoism condemnation was naturally linked, 
in what concerned lower and higher classes, to specific functions in labor division. 
33  Horkheimer, M., “Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung – zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters”, op. 
cit., pp. 9-12 and p. 17. 
34  These ideals wouldn’ t contradict “bourgeois coldness” at any point. See Horkheimer, M., “Egoismus und Frei-
heitsbewegung – zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters”, op. cit., p. 19. See also, for this issue, Marcuse, 
H., “Über den affirmativen Charakter der Kultur”, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (Vol. 6), M. Horkheimer 
(Ed.), Munich, DTV, 1980 (1937), p. 60. 
35  See Horkheimer, M., “Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie”, op. cit., p. 263. This aspect of 
Horkheimer’s argument provides evidence against the common tendency among Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s 
interpreters (specially among some of their Frankfurter “heirs”) to associate early critical theory with a closed 
philosophy of history, to whose principles all social, psychological and political phenomena could be reduced. 
See, for example, Habermas, J., “Nachwort”, op. cit., passim, as well as the already mentioned interpretation of 
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As for the nearly psychopathic character traits that would be dominant in the 
first half of the twentieth century (see Horkheimer’s quote in the beginning of this 
item), they also seem to have been a result of such a historical process. A motive 
often overlooked in Horkheimer’s essays is the proletariat’s integration: according 
to the author, bourgeoisie had recently turned “wide areas of Europe into huge 
labor camps”, and here is to be stressed the political and processual character of 
the phenomenon, which cannot be interpreted as a structural result of monopoly 
capitalism 36. Indeed, in what respects the German case, labor process rationaliza-
tion (“Taylorism”) during Weimar Republic (a trend largely supported by social 
democrats), as well as the development of mass production and mass consumption 
(“Fordism”) under the Nazi regime were both, in Horkheimer’s view, combined 
efforts for ensuring bourgeois domination 37. Social integration of workers was in 
close connection with the decline of the role of family in education and sociali-
zation in general, a function progressively assumed by the state (especially by its 
Honneth, A., Kritik der Macht – Reflexionsstufen einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie, op. cit., pp. 33-41. It is 
worthy noting that more recent interpreters – such as John Abromeit – insist on the contrary, i.e. on the his-
torical specificity of Horkheimer’s analyses. The interpretation which is outlined here has some common traits 
with Abromeit’s one, who also understood Horkheimer’s anthropology of the bourgeois era as if Horkheimer 
had historicized Fromm’s theory. But while Abromeit underlined as Horkheimer’s specific contributions the use 
of historical research (supposedly as a means of overcoming limitations of his Marxist theoretical framework) 
and the integration of the central elements of Fromm’s social psychology into a Marxist theory of history, my 
point is that his anthropology consisted in a specifically Marxist critique of fetishism inherent to dominant 
anthropological conceptions (which had influenced even Fromm’s work). This critique would also point out 
to emancipation possibilities, as discussed later. See Abromeit, J., Max Horkheimer and the foundations of the 
Frankfurt School, op. cit., pp. 249-261. The aspect of a critique of contradictions, inherent to Horkheimer’s 
analyses on the bourgeois character, was also stressed by Jairo Iván Escobar Moncada. See the author’s “Sobre la 
mentalidad burguesa en Max Horkheimer y José Luis Romero”, op. cit., passim. Escobar Moncada also criticized 
the common interpretative tendency mentioned above: in a lecture held in September 2015 at Universidad 
del Norte (Colombia), he argued that Horkheimer’s work would be up to the task of thinking human nature 
without relying either on historical reductionism or on scientific naturalism, for Horkheimer, who followed 
here the footsteps of Marx and Engels in German Ideology, was convinced that nature and culture are different 
and united at the same time (the target of the lecturer’s argument was Herbert Schnädelbach’s appraisal of early 
critical theory, which would be negligent about this point). See Escobar Moncada, J. I., “Sobre antropología 
e historia en Max Horkheimer”, lecture at Primera Jornada de Teoría Crítica (“First Conference on Critical 
Theory”), Baranquilla (Colombia), 2015. Available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2p-4cSVyHg 
Accessed June 7th, 2018.
36  Horkheimer, M., “Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie”, op. cit., p. 264. On this issue, see also 
Horkheimer, M., “Autoritärer Staat”, op. cit., pp. 295-298.
37  “In Weimar Republic, proletarian opposition, as long as it did not perish in the midst of a number of sects, 
succumbed itself to administration spirit”. Horkheimer, M., “Autoritärer Staat”, Max Horkheimer - Gesammelte 
Schriften (Vol. 5), A. Schmidt and G. S. Noerr (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1987 (1940/1942), p. 296. 
On this issue, see also Horkheimer, M., “Die Juden und Europa”, Max Horkheimer - Gesammelte Schriften (Vol. 
4), A. Schmidt and G. S. Noerr (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1988 (1939), pp. 126-127. For a detailed 
view on this subject, see von Freyberg, T., Industrielle Rationalisierung in der Weimarer Republik – untersucht 
an Beispielen aus dem Maschinenbau und der Elektroindustrie, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 1989, 
specially pp. 312-316.
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totalitarian forms) and also – as Horkheimer and Adorno would formulate most 
clearly in the 1940s – by culture industry: the diminishing of parental authority, 
albeit linked with the relativization of conservative cultural patterns and with some 
emancipatory trends (such as the acknowledgement of women’s rights), meant also 
the reinforcement of social domination 38. These changes had also an anthropologi-
cal meaning, for they implied the constituting of individuals whose character traits 
could play an active role in their domination: 
“The transformation of the oppressed labourer, who in nineteenth century wandered 
about in his quest for work, in the diligent member of fascist organizations recalls, in its 
historical significance, the change which had been undertaken by Reformation, as it turned 
medieval master craftsman into protestant bourgeois, or poor English villager into modern 
industrial worker” 39.
How were these anthropological reflections related by Horkheimer to the pos-
sibility of social change? Until approximately 1936 prevailed a revolutionary per-
spective. Besides alienness, exchange-based economy had for Horkheimer led to 
the constitution of character traits which could serve in the building of emancipat-
ed society, as for instance respect for others and the ability to stick, independently 
of self-interest, to moral values, truth and given word - considering those would 
be a part of revolutionary process. Instead of trying to extract some revolutionary 
character stemming from considerations on class structure, Horkheimer focused on 
the mediation between the individual and the masses: in revolutionary movement, 
the mass would be “differentiated and aware”, and individuals with those positive 
traits would play an active role in politics. Besides, the existence of emotional, 
i.e. “irrational” elements in the relation between followers and leaders (which for 
Horkheimer would be part of any authority relation) would not mean the reduc-
tion of individuals to insignificance. As far as he did not operate with Fromm’s 
rationalistic distinction between “autonomy” and “heteronomy”, Horkheimer 
conceived of “authority” as a phenomenon in which both would be intertwined, 
and for him the existence of “irrational” (we might even say: of sadomasochistic) 
elements in authority relations did not exclude, for example, that the mass could 
be taken seriously by the movement’s avant-garde, without its members having to 
obey moralizing discourse and some leftist condemnation of individual satisfaction 
(understood as mere selfishness). The deleterious nature of egoism consisted in its 
38  For the changing functions of family, see for example Horkheimer, M., “Allgemeiner Teil”, op. cit., pp. 62-63 
and pp. 74-75.
39  Horkheimer, M., “Die Juden und Europa”, op. cit., p. 118. 
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mobilization by classes, nations and individuals as an stimulus for concurrency – in 
a rational society, egoism (as constitutive of bourgeois individual) would conversely 
change its function, and also would egoism repression, which in capitalist society 
serves mainly class domination 40. As for masses in counter-revolutionary move-
ments, on their turn, there would not be any place left for connecting individuals’ 
needs with the movement’s goals, the libidinal structure of its members being used 
mainly for the satisfaction of their repressed drives 41. 
Around the beginning 1940s, withers away in Horkheimer’s works, as widely 
discussed in the reception, the “dynamic unity” between critical theory and work-
ing class, as had been asserted by the author still in 1937 42. Discussions about the 
relation between the individual and the masses are abandoned when it becomes 
clear that, in an era of integration, bourgeois moral had lost its critical elements, 
and reduced itself to immediate interest 43. Notwithstanding the conversion of 
individuals to monads guided by self-preservation, there would be yet elements 
pointing to emancipation 44. If reification had not, as foreseen by Lukács, led to 
class-consciousness and to the passing from contemplation to action, workers had 
in any case become “unwilling, grumpy and disobedient” 45. Individuals, the more 
intensely they integrated themselves into society, the more they would have to des-
perately repress, in themselves and in others, every drive in contrary. Emerging 
from violence to which individuals were subjected along this process, their hatred 
is projected in everything that stands for non-integrated difference - by this way, 
aggressors choose their victims after finding in them signs of their own impotence. 
Nonetheless, “it is precisely this spite [Gehässigkeit] that shows how humanity was 
not overarched on the whole by repressive collectivization of men” 46. Itself an ele-
40  By this way, idealistic asceticism and the “affirmative character of culture” would tend to disappear. Horkheimer, 
M., “Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung – zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters”, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
41  Horkheimer, M., “Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung – zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters”, op. cit., 
pp. 71-72. The revolution rehearsals at the end of World War I could not therefore be equated with adhesion of 
parts of working class to the “pseudorevolution” led by fascists. 
42  See Horkheimer, M., “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie”, op. cit., pp. 186-189. As to the main phases 
in Horkheimer’s work, see Habermas, J., “Remarks on the Development of Horkheimer’s Work”, On Max 
Horkheimer – new perspectives, S. Benhabib, W. Bonß and J. McCole (Eds.), Cambridge, Massachussets and 
London, The MIT Press, 1993, pp. 49-66. 
43  See Horkheimer, M., “Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung”, Max Horkheimer - Gesammelte Schriften (Vol. 5), A. 
Schmidt and G. S. Noerr (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1987 (1942). This change process had been 
noticed by the author at least since 1935. See Horkheimer, M., “Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropo-
logie”, op. cit., pp. 262-263, p. 267 and pp. 273- 275.
44  See Horkheimer, M., “Autoritärer Staat”, op. cit., pp. 316-317.
45  See Horkheimer, M., “Zur Soziologie der Klassenverhältnisse”, op. cit., p. 99.
46  See Horkheimer, M., “Zur Soziologie der Klassenverhältnisse”, op. cit., p. 99, and also Horkheimer, M., “Die 
Rackets und der Geist”, op. cit., p. 291. Suffering to which individuals are subjected in their socialization would 
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ment of domination, this behavior would also be a “disturbing factor”, compelling 
rulers to draw on fascist governments and falsely collective models of socialization, 
themselves the mere superficial expressions of a more profound collectivization 
which operates through dissolution of individuals, but whose complete effective-
ness would have to be ensured by terror and propaganda. The necessary change 
in order to build a society where people could “regulate their issues in solidarity 
with each other” would nevertheless be much smaller than transformation already 
induced in them by actual society: under the mere “grimaces” to which individuals 
have been reduced hides the possibility of a better reality 47. One of the tasks of crit-
ical thought would then be making men conscious of their own deformation - this 
would be, in Horkheimer’s words, the “method in midst of madness”:
“Non-identity of almost every individual with himself - as he is, at the same time and 
without any intention of coherence, Nazi and anti-Nazi, convinced and skeptical, brave and 
cowardly, stupid and clever - is the only behavior which really does justice to a reality that is 
not defined by so-called plans, but by the concentration camp. Demonstrating to men that 
they are not themselves different from those who have been shattered by the camps is the 
method in midst of madness” 48.
come into light and turn into the hatred of nature which could not be dominated, but at whose “overridden 
matter” liberty “irresistibly shines through”. Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T. W., Dialektik der Aufklärung, 
Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1986 (1944), p. 192.
47  See Horkheimer, M., “Autoritärer Staat”, op. cit., p. 317, and also Horkheimer, M., “Zur Soziologie der Klas-
senverhältnisse”, op. cit., p. 392.
48  Horkheimer, M., “Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung”, op. cit., p. 346. This idea would be later developed by 
Adorno in his reflections on education. See, for example, his essay on “Education after Auschwitz”.
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